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BOOK REVIEW
Showing, Sensing, and Seeming: 
Distinctively Sensory Representations and 
their Contents
DOMINIC GREGORY
oup. 2013. pp. xii + 230. £35 (hbk).
Many pictures, imaginings, and memories are ‘dis-
tinctively sensory’ representations: they ‘show things 
as looking or sounding or otherwise standing senso-
rily certain ways’ (vii). The aim of Dominic Gregory’s 
Showing, Sensing, and Seeming is to see what can be 
gained by theorizing about these representations as 
a class. The book makes a convincing case that the 
answer is: quite a lot. Clearly written and well argued, 
it offers a theory of distinctively sensory representa-
tions—the first of its kind—and then uses it to weigh 
in on a range of debates. Some of the book reworks 
material from earlier articles by Gregory. Even in the 
rare cases where there is overlap, though, the ideas 
are better appreciated within the context of Gregory’s 
theoretical framework of distinctively sensory repre-
sentations, which is only developed in the monograph. 
In this reviewer’s opinion, Showing, Sensing, and Seeming 
deserves the attention of anyone interested in mental 
imagery, pictures, or indeed any type of distinctively 
sensory representation.
The book divides into two parts. The first half 
(Chapters 1–4) presents the theory of distinctively sen-
sory representations, while the second half (Chapters 
5–8) considers applications of the theory to issues 
concerning specific types of distinctively sensory rep-
resentations. The bulk of the theory is presented in 
Chapter 3, though it resists tidy summary, as it builds 
on preparatory material developed in Chapter 2 and is 
then further refined in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, there 
are three guiding ideas to the theoretical framework 
(these are stated as Principles (3A)–(3D)):
Distinctively sensory showing comes from sensory informa-
tiveness. ‘Distinctively sensory contents single out 
ways for things to stand sensorily in subjectively infor-
mative ways: they single out types of sensations just 
in terms of what it is like to have sensations of the 
relevant kind. And that is why distinctively sensory 
representations show things as standing sensorily cer-
tain ways’ (48).
Scene-showing corresponds to seeming. ‘A distinctively 
sensory representation shows an F which is G, on 
account of the ways that the representation shows 
things as standing sensorily, just in case there is some 
way that the representation shows things as standing 
sensorily which is such that anyone who has a sensa-
tion of that kind thereby seems sensorily to encounter 
an F which is G’ (52).
Distinctively sensory representations are sensation- or 
perspective-characterizing. Distinctively sensory rep-
resentations can single out their sensation-types for 
the purpose of either characterizing a sensation or a 
perspective. A distinctively sensory representation is 
sensation-characterizing just in case its content ‘char-
acterizes one or more sensations as being instances 
of … sensation-types’ (54), whereas it is perspec-
tive-characterizing just in case it ‘characterizes the 
appearance-contents of … sensation-types as being 
true relative to one or more perspectives’ (57).
One of the aims of this half of the book is to show how 
this theory can explain some key features that distinc-
tively sensory representations share—features which 
Gregory identifies in Chapter 1. For example, distinc-
tively sensory representations are perspectival: they 
show things as standing certain ways from perspec-
tives. Gregory shows how this perspectivalness fol-
lows from his account. An interesting feature of this 
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part of the book is how Gregory uses the account to 
argue against Peacocke’s (1985) and Martin’s (2002) 
provocative contention that visualizings are always 
imaginings of visual experiences.1 Gregory does this 
by arguing that distinctively sensory representations 
come in two varieties: sensation-characterizing and 
perspective-characterizing. While sensation-charac-
terizing visualizings are visualizings of experiences, 
perspective-characterizing visualizings are not.
The second half of the book applies the theory to 
issues concerning specific types of distinctively sen-
sory representations: mental imagery (Chapter  5), 
pictures (Chapters 6–7) and distinctively sensory 
records (Chapter 8). Chapter 5 revisits the thesis that 
visual mental images are stored in a picture-like for-
mat, which seems to be the orthodoxy among psy-
chologists. Several fascinating studies by Kosslyn 
and others have been used in support of this view.2 
Gregory’s aim is to show that this behavioral and neu-
rological data can be explained by assuming only that 
visual mental images have the same sorts of contents 
as pictures or visual experiences, a consequence of 
Gregory’s theory. Gregory argues that this strategy 
works better than Pylyshyn’s attempt to rebut the 
orthodoxy, which requires that visualizings involve 
the simulation of visual experiences.3 Gregory’s strat-
egy may prove fruitful here: if correct, it suggests 
that similar potential data about the other sensory 
modalities (if it can be found, that is: the topic is far 
less explored) could be subjected to a similar strategy.
Chapters 6 and 7 cover pictures. An important 
theme in Chapter  6 is that there is a fundamental 
divide between two types of pictures, and we should 
not expect accounts of depiction to cover both. In 
particular, while many pictures fall into the class 
of distinctively sensory representations (‘distinc-
tively visual pictures’), many others do not (prime 
examples of the latter are toddler’s drawings and 
Cubist paintings). Gregory suggests that it is unclear 
whether extant accounts of depiction aim to be fully 
general, or instead cover just distinctively visual pic-
tures but, in any case, suggests that they be inter-
preted as only aiming at covering the latter. When 
thus interpreted, Gregory evaluates three major 
styles of accounts against a criterion, which emerges 
from his theory. He argues that accounts in terms of 
recognition or pretence do not meet the criterion, 
while accounts using experienced resemblances do. 
Here Gregory briefly remarks that an account that 
makes use of ‘objective’ resemblances might fare at 
least as well (155, n. 58). I would have liked to see 
this possibility explored further. I  am also curious 
to see how Greenberg’s account of depiction, which 
does not neatly fit into Gregory’s taxonomy, would 
fare.4 Chapter 7 considers several other issues con-
cerning pictures—notably, it provides an account of 
lifelikeness in pictures, and discusses the importance 
of ambiguity to understanding many pictures.
The final chapter deals with ‘distinctively sensory 
records’, or distinctively sensory representations that 
show things as standing certain ways from past per-
spectives or in past sensations. Gregory addresses 
epistemological differences among distinctively sen-
sory records to explain, for example, why it is that 
photographs are typically better able to transmit 
information than handmade pictures, or why it is that 
sensory memories can generate knowledge. In doing 
so, Gregory heavily relies on Burge’s entitlement 
framework and in particular its principle to trust 
appearances.5 Gregory uses it to suggest that appar-
ent sensory memories have a special epistemic status 
not shared by photographs, for example. Yet Gregory 
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says very little about how the issues should look to 
epistemologists not working within this framework. 
It seems plausible that for someone only interested 
in the reliability or safety of the method employed, 
apparent sensory memories will lack this special epis-
temic status.
In the Conclusion, Gregory gestures at the rel-
evance of his theory to other issues. I’ll conclude by 
highlighting its relevance to two additional debates. 
A key consequence of Gregory’s theory is that dis-
tinctively sensory representations have the same 
kinds of contents as their experiential counterparts. 
So, if the property of being a table can figure in the 
contents of visual experiences, then it also can figure 
in the contents of visualizings and other distinctively 
visual representations. Gregory stays neutral on 
whether the contents of visual experience include 
tablehood and other high-level contents (8). Yet the 
account seems to interact in interesting ways with 
this issue. One way that low-level content theorists 
have pushed back on alleged cases of visual experi-
ences with high-level contents is to remark that we 
mistake visual imaginings or memories with parts of 
our visual experiences, owing to their phenomenal 
similarity.6 Gregory’s theory suggests a constraint 
any such response should obey: the same types of 
contents figure in the distinctively visual represen-
tations as in the visual experiences; so the low-level 
theorist’s response cannot assume that the contents 
of visual imaginings or memories include high-level 
contents. Rather, the idea has to be that visual imag-
inings with low-level contents co-occur with visual 
experiences with different low-level experiences 
to change the overall character of our experience. 
A second potential application concerns the role of 
distinctively sensory representations in the episte-
mology of the future as well as the epistemology 
of possibility. Gregory focuses almost exclusively 
on their role in the epistemology of the past. Yet 
mental imagery seems to be capable of generating 
knowledge of future and merely possible scenarios. 
It seems that one way I can come to know that I can 
grasp the mug in front of me involves my visually 
imagining a scene slightly different from the one 
presently before me. What role Gregory’s theory can 
play in accounting for knowledge like this remains 
to be seen. All this is to say that Showing, Sensing, and 
Seeming contributes a theory of relevance to many 
philosophical issues.
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